This article describes, within a myopic intergenerational bargaining framework incorporating two discrete periods and binary states of risks, some new aspects regarding the mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social security. Here, state-dependent utility under mortality risk proves to generate parents' peculiar indifference curve regarding insurance contract, and self-insurance is shown to play a crucial role on the decision regarding social security holding and intergenerational transfer contract. This peculiar aspect, given for the first time in this article, also derives some novel features of insurance theory under lifetime uncertainty, where the current position in social security contract could adversely affect parents' decision regarding intergenerational risk sharing with children. In addition, other basic results regarding the sensitivity to default risk and taxation in social security are summarized.
Introduction
The objective of this article is simply and clearly to describe some new economic aspects of intergenerational risk sharing under lifetime uncertainty within a myopic bargaining framework. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) are textbooks of public economics and international macroeconomics, especially the latter of which contains the description of a risk sharing with default risk and saving. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) develop a basic theory of demand for insurance that emphasizes the interaction between market insurance, "self-insurance" and "self-protection". For some other examples among related literatures, Shiller (1999) , Ball and Mankiw (2001) , Enders and Lapan (1982) and Gordon and Varian (1988) examine the economic role of intergenerational risk sharing. Yaari (1965) is a classical article, which pursuits the implications of life insurance under the mortality risk. Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996) is an empirical work on intra-gamily & inter-generational risk sharing accompanying the possibility of self-insurance. Analyses on bequest motives appear, among many, in Abel (1985 Abel ( , 1987 , Hurd (1989) , Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985) and Bernheim (1991) .
In this article we newly focus on a peculiar shape of parents' indifference curve, which arises from a state dependent aspect of utility under a life uncertainty environment, using a model of two discrete periods and binary states of mortality/income risks. In section 2, a basic framework is set, in which two adjacent generations, parents in old adulthood and children in young adulthood are facing the decision regarding intergenerational risk sharing with/without an available old-age social security for parents. In section 3, some characteristics in parents' difference curve are explained, where self-insurance plays an important role on the insurance contract decision. On the basis of these analyses, we claim some fundamental propositions regarding the optimal allocation of social security and intergenerational risk sharing in section 4, and some regarding the sensitivity to default risk and taxation in social security in section 5.
Basic setting
At first we divide each generation's lifetime roughly into three stages, "Y " (for the child), " M " (for the young adulthood) and " O " (for the old adulthood), each of which corresponds with each discrete period (≑30 years). Assume that, at the beginning of period t , two adjacent generations, " p " (parents) and " c " (children) (2) 
(ii) Assume that Y coincides with F , the point which attains parents' minimum utility on p X . Then, for any arbitrary 
in the direction to G , for a slight positive change in K .
Just for purely mathematical interest, we claim following two lemmas.
Lemma 1:
p X (A segment line GF ) has a negative tangent slope (of R with regard to P ), which is less than -1. Also, a segment line JD , which is a part of ac X , has a negative tangent slope (of R with regard to P ), which is less than -1.
Lemma 2: Denote a tangent point of parents' indifference curve with a constant premium line,
is the same point as E .) Then the locus of the set of point k E , has a negative tangent slope (of R with regard to P ), which is less than -1.
The proof of next Proposition is directly derived from Lemma 2. 
2). Furthermore, parents' associated indirect utility including default risk is re-defined as: 21
Now we examine the sensitivity of parents' demand for an actuarially fair social security in the sense of (5.1) and (5.2), when h deviates slightly from 0 (zero) by a positive bit. In particular, our interest is in the sensitivity of an optimal contract E and a reservation 19 Therefore condition (iv) of (2.4) has been relaxed. 
. 23 Now we claim a following proposition.
Proposition 4: (Parents' demand sensitivity to default risk) Assume that social security has default risk with conditional actuarially fair condition (5.1). Then we have:
irrespective of the value of s .
Instead of (5.1), assume that social security has default risk with unconditional actuarially fair condition (5.2). Then it always holds that: 
Instead of (5.4), assume that social security has default risk with unconditional actuarially fair condition (5.5). Then (ii)
In either case of (5.4) or (5.5),
where children fully insure their income risk.
Sensitivity to taxation
We turn our focus to taxation on social security both for parents and children. Consider two kinds of tax: a lump-sum actuarially fair tax, and an exercise tax only on payment P .
Let R T and P T be conditional taxes imposed on the realization of receipt R and payment P , respectively. Lump-sum actuarially fair tax is described as ) , (
P R T T
, where
for parents and
). An exercise tax on payment P , is described as
, and we assume tax-deducted actuarially fair conditions,
(5.9) for children. z is defined as a proportional tax rate on P .
The expected tax income by the government is,
(5.10) for parents, ) , ( P R , remain almost the same as (2.4a) for parents, and (2.4b) for children:
Clearly a lump-sum actuarially fair tax is better than an exercise tax on payment P , for both parents and children, in the sense that, keeping the expected tax income ET at constant, a lump-sum actuarially fair tax could always attain better associated indirect utility with regard to ) , ( P R , than an exercise tax only on payment P .
We proceed to the sensitivity analysis to an exercise taxation on payment P , as described in (5.8) for parents and (5.9) for children. (5.8) and (5.9) are, in a sense, equivalent with unconditional actuarially fair conditions incorporating default risk, (5.2) for parents and (5.5) for children, respectively, if we set
. Here, we can interpret h as a conditional profit margin or a subsidy margin on the realization of receipt R . Denote parents' optimal demand for social security with the condition (5.8) by 
Final remarks
In a continuous-time case, parents' problem to be solved can be represented as follows:
Define parents' transfer contract incorporating the risk of death 
Equivalently in a differential form: 
From all the above points, our analysis made in the previous 4 sections with two discrete periods does not lose any generality even in a continuous-time case.
Thus this article has just summarized, using a simple model of two discrete periods and binary states of mortality/income risks, some fundamental propositions regarding the mixture of intergenerational risk sharing and social security. Here for the first time, state-dependent utility under mortality risk proves to generate parents' peculiar indifference curve regarding insurance contract, and self-insurance is shown to play a crucial role on the decision regarding social security holding and intergenerational transfer Economics, Vol. 37, 1988, 185-202. f B S l ) 1 ( : 
26 (A1.1-3) can be rewritten as: 
(ii) (Case: 
. For later convenience, we rewrite
using the amount of receipt for social
, 27 because parents are indifferent between D and F . So, at first we show that, 27 That is,
and next show that
can never catch and overpass
First step: Since, given an intergenerational transferY , parents need not pay an additional cost on death (i.e., one constraint 0 '³ P is binding.), we can rewrite (A1.1-3) as: 
From the envelope theorem, also using (A1.3), we obtain:
Similarly we obtain the following equation quite easily:
Denote the point at which parents indifference curve, which crosses a solution point of (A1. 
From the definition, we also have;
So, from (A1.7) and (A1.8), it follows that:
(As graphically clear, P increases (moves) along parents indifference curve from ac W to W , R also increases.) 28 For the first order condition, we have
where * denotes that
and also 0 > dP , from (A1.9) and (A1.10) we get
, so we have completed the first step, that is, have proved (A1.2).
Second step: Assume that for some ) , ( : 
From the continuity of
Proof of Lemma 1:
Graphically it is clear that, for any points on a segment line JD of ac X , which is the subset of solution points for (A1.1-1), one constraint 0 '³ P is not binding. So, from the first order condition, we have a following equality:
Taking R as a function of P , and differentiate (A2.1) with regard to P , we obtain:
Proof of Lemma 2:
Plugging the constant premium condition
we obtain the first order condition:
Taking P as a function of k , and differentiate (A2.4) with regard to k , we obtain;
from which it follows that 1 0 < < dk dP
we have 1 -< dP dR . Now the proof is done.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof of (i): Parents' associated indirect utility including default risk is given in (5.3).
Maximizing (5.3) subject to (5.1) with regard to P (and implicitly R ), we have the first order condition for point
Replacing P with ) (h P as a function of h in (A3.1), differentiating the equality with regard to h , and implementing the comparative statics immediately produces the following equation: Proof of (iii): The proof is almost the same as proof of (i) except for maximizing (5.3) subject to (5.2) instead of (5.1). The first order condition for point h E is:
We get a following equation for comparative statics:
H.S is negative, and the coefficient of
Proof of (ii): Since (5.3) must be constant subject to (5.1), we have:
The first order condition with regard to h produces:
So, we need the sign of the coefficient of
But, this is exactly the first order condition at
, which should be 0 at E . Since ) (
is located in the left-down side of E along 1 l , so (A3.7) should have a positive value. The proof is now done.
Proof of (iv): Since (5.3) must be constant subject to (5.2), we have:
Differentiating (A3.8) with regard to h produces:
Now we have only to examine the sign of the coefficient of
, which is exactly the same as (A3.7). Since
, we can apply the same argument as after (A3.7) in the proof of (ii). The proof is now done.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof of (i): Children's associated indirect utility including default risk is given in (5.6).
Maximizing (5.6) subject to (5.4) with regard to R (and implicitly P ) and 1 c , we have the first order condition, with regard to R , for some value of 1 c such that
we have: 
Proof of (ii): Quite similar to proof of (i). Maximizing (5.6) subject to (5.5), in stead of subject to (5.4), with regard to R (and implicitly 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof of (i): Parents' associated indirect utility is given by (2.5a''). Maximizing (2.5a'') subject to (5.8) with regard to R (and implicitly P ), we have the first order condition: Proof of (ii): Parents' associated indirect utility is given by (A2.5). Maximizing (2.5a'') subject to (5.8) with regard to P (and implicitly R ), we have the first order condition: 
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof of (i): Children's associated indirect utility including default risk is given in (2.5b').
Maximizing (2.5b') subject to (5.9) with regard to R (and implicitly P ) and 1 c , we have the first order condition, with regard to R , for some value of 1 c such that 
